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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE RITES OF DISSENT: NOTES ON NATIONALIST FEDERALISM
Responding to Heather K. Gerken’s Childress Lecture, Federalism and
Nationalism: Time for a Détente?
JESSICA BULMAN-POZEN*
It is at least superficially paradoxical that a lecture celebrating dissent,
resistance, and contestation is framed as a plea for rapprochement, mutual
conciliation, and compromise. Is Heather Gerken engaged in peacemaking
between “opposing camps”?1 Or is she flamethrowing? And if it’s both, if
she’s trying to negotiate a truce by provoking both sides, is she antagonizing
everyone or only the federalists? Do she and other proponents of nationalist
federalism—and I should note at the outset that I include myself in this
group—challenge precepts of the nationalists at all?
As Gerken recognizes, nationalist federalism seems, at least at first blush,
to demand greater concessions from members of what she terms the federalist
“camp.”2 It upends their very definition of federalism. While they understand
federalism in terms of a sphere of sovereign, or at least autonomous, state
authority and disparage arrangements that don’t give states the final word as
mere decentralization,3 Gerken insists that states can fare just fine without
sovereignty or autonomy. She is not shy about what she’s asking the federalist

* Associate Professor, Columbia Law School. Thanks to my fellow symposium participants, Joel
Goldstein, David Pozen, and the editors of the Saint Louis University Law Journal.
1. Heather K. Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a Détente?, 59 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 997, 997 (2015).
2. Id. at 1010.
3. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928 (1997) (“It is an essential attribute of
the States’ retained sovereignty that they remain independent and autonomous within their proper
sphere of authority.”); JENNA BEDNAR, THE ROBUST FEDERATION: PRINCIPLES OF DESIGN 18–19
(2009) (defining federalism to require the constitutionally declared sovereignty of both state and
federal governments); WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 11
(1964) (defining federalism to require the autonomy of both state and federal governments in
their own spheres); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism:
Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 816
(1998) (arguing that federalism requires state autonomy, rather than sovereignty); Ernest A.
Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 4 (2004) (proposing “strong
autonomy” as the linchpin of federalism).
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camp to give up. Even her labels seem designed to rankle. Calling states
“servants”4 is hardly the way to win federalist hearts and minds.
So how does she propose to sell the federalists on her détente? By showing
that there is no real alternative. First, she tells us, the federalists have already
lost the doctrinal war; if Washington seeks to regulate in an area, it may do so.5
And, by and large, it has. So there’s not much left for federalists who cling to
state sovereignty or even autonomy. If they are not willing to recognize a new
form of federalism, they will be left without any federalism at all. Then comes
some reassurance: there is still state power to be had without an independent
sphere of action. As a practical matter, states retain substantial authority to
govern even when they occupy the same regulatory space as the federal
government—even when they are the federal government’s servants.6 So
understood, contemporary nationalism accommodates a substantial degree of
state power.
If Gerken approaches the federalists with a clear-eyed description of the
contemporary landscape, she frames her appeal to the “nationalist camp”7 in
more normative terms. Yes, Washington may regulate with a free hand as a
legal matter, she says, but there is good reason for even a committed nationalist
to value state power.8 Devolving authority to the states can “improv[e] national
politics, strengthen[] a national polity, better[] national policymaking,
entrench[] national norms, consolidat[e] national policies, and increas[e]
national power.”9 Nationalists should think twice, Gerken urges, before
assuming that centralization best furthers their vision.
What is Gerken really asking of the nationalist camp? And what, for that
matter, is “nationalism” in this project? If she would replace federalists’ very
definition of federalism, she seems to seek a more modest concession from
those who have traditionally sided with Washington: accepting that
devolution—to non-sovereign, non-autonomous states, no less—may
sometimes further the ends of a national government or, more generously, a
national polity. Does “[u]nderstanding federalism as the new nationalism”
actually “complicate[] both the federalism and the nationalism sides of the
equation,” as I have elsewhere argued,10 or just generate an equivalence by
redefining federalism?

4. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1010.
5. Id. at 1009.
6. Id. at 1010–11.
7. Id. at 1001.
8. E.g., id. at 999–1001.
9. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1002 (quoting Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New
Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE L.J. 1889, 1893 (2014)).
10. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process to Administration and Politics:
The Afterlife of American Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1920, 1923 (2014) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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In this response, I consider how the nationalist school of federalism
reconceptualizes nationalism, and not only federalism. Taking as my starting
point Gerken’s claim that federalism can be good for nationalism, that
nationalists should “believe in giving power to the states,”11 I first outline two
possible understandings of nationalism suggested by this claim—that
“national” refers to the federal government, and that “national” refers to a
unified American polity—and explain what it would mean for federalism to
serve nationalism so understood. After rejecting both accounts, I sketch the
view of nationalism I propose we continue to develop. It is a nationalism that is
ineluctably pluralist, one that recognizes multiple and competing national
interests, institutions, and constituencies. In brief, then, this response proposes
that we do for nationalism what scholars—Gerken foremost among them12—
have recently been doing for federalism. If important pieces have examined the
multiple ways in which states exercise power without separate spheres of
action, more work needs to study the effects of state-federal integration on our
nationalism. We must grapple with the diversity of the national and examine,
in particular, how this diversity is itself generated and instantiated by the
states.
I.
Try talking about federalism, and you quickly find yourself tripping over
the vocabulary: Does federalism refer to the empowerment of the states or the
consolidation of power in a central government?13 With anti-federalism long
purged from our vocabulary, one response has been to align “federal” with the
states and “national” with the federal, er, national government. This has hardly

11. Gerken, supra note 1, at 999.
12. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, 62 DUKE L.J. 1349 (2013);
Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549 (2012); Heather K.
Gerken, The Supreme Court 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV.
L. REV. 4 (2010) [hereinafter Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down]; see also, e.g., Jessica
Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009);
Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of
Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534 (2011).
13. See, e.g., Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493, 499–500 (2008)
(noting that “federalism is a euphemism for at least four partially incompatible preferences,”
including the diffusion of authority to states and the centralization of authority in the federal
government); see also Antonin Scalia, The Two Faces of Federalism, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
19, 19 (1982) (“In meeting to discuss federalism, we have to bear in mind that it is a form of
government midway between two extremes. At one extreme, the autonomy, the disunity, the
conflict of independent states; at the other, the uniformity, the inflexibility, the monotony of one
centralized government. Federalism is meant to be a compromise between the two. As such, it is a
stick that can be used to beat either dog. When Alexander Hamilton exalted its virtues, he meant
it as a criticism of colonial disunity; we mean it today—in this [Federalist Society] group, at
least—as a criticism of central control.”).
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been a universally embraced move, but at least it held out some hope of
semantic precision. When juxtaposed with “national,” we knew what “federal”
meant.
And then along comes the nationalist school of federalism and complicates
references to nationalism, too. The term now might encompass devolution as
well as centralization, power to the states as well as power to Washington, a
fractious polity’s disagreements as well as a final negotiated accord.14 What’s a
student of federalism to do? Or, to put it more constructively, what does the
nationalist school take nationalism to be? Here, I want to briefly sketch—but
ultimately reject—two answers that might be offered: first, that “national” is
indeed a stand-in for the federal government, and second, that “national”
evokes not Washington, but rather a unified American community.
Of course, nationalism might refer to other things as well. Perhaps
ironically, for instance, one thing the nationalist school of federalism clearly
does not mean is the sort of provincialism or patriotism vis-à-vis other nations
that the dictionary might suggest. Because nationalism is juxtaposed in this
work with federalism, instead of with internationalism, transnationalism, or
cosmopolitanism, it does not refer to a doctrine that American culture or
interests are superior to those of other nations, a belief that the U.S. should go
it alone, or any sort of aspiration of a people for independence. While in our
interdependent world, the transnational dimensions of our federalism merit
attention as well,15 for purposes of this brief response, matters are complicated
enough with a focus on the domestic.
So, first, maybe the nationalist school of federalism intends each term to
have its conventional meaning: federalism as state power and nationalism as
federal government power. This seems a fair reading of what Gerken’s
“nationalist camp” must believe. To the extent there is a “camp” opposed to
those who champion state sovereignty and autonomy, it must comprise those
who favor centralization in Washington.16
One might think, then, that the nationalist school of federalism reconciles
federalism and nationalism by arguing that federalism enhances the power of
the federal government itself, that devolution ultimately, if paradoxically,
yields centralization. There are indeed some arguments to this effect in the

14. See Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE
L.J. 1889 (2014).
15. See, e.g., Judith Resnik et al., Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism,
Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAs), 50 ARIZ. L. REV.
709 (2008); Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and
Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006).
16. See Gerken, supra note 1, at 1001.
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burgeoning nationalist federalism literature17 and, I hasten to add, some ways
in which federal government actors may benefit from granting authority to the
states. Edward Rubin and Malcolm Feeley have long argued that federalism
without state sovereignty is in fact decentralization, which might readily be
embraced by Washington as a policy matter.18 Abbe Gluck makes the
argument without jettisoning state sovereignty, describing how devolving the
administration of federal statutory schemes to states may allow Congress to
enter areas previously occupied exclusively by the states and to entrench
federal law.19 On her account, conferring implementation authority on the
states is often “a specific strategy used by the federal government to strengthen
its new federal laws and the federal norms they introduce.”20
In a more theoretical vein, Richard Ford contends that the “production of
local difference can be an effective strategy for consolidating and maintaining
centralized power.”21 In the United States, the common narrative describes
“progressive centralization of power at the expense of locally distinctive
political communities such as the states and local governments.”22 But, he tells
us, while centralization has indeed occurred, so too has local difference been
“produced and enshrined, not only as an act of resistance to centralized power,
but also as a mechanism of the centralization of power.”23 Ford’s story is
largely about congressional districts and local governments,24 but the
nationalist view of federalism makes states more similar to these nonsovereign units. Once federalism does not mean the states rule their own
fiefdoms separate and apart from the federal government, they start to look
more like local governments—a view Gerken in particular has embraced.25
Perhaps, then, the creation or reinforcement of difference through devolution
to states ultimately enhances the federal government’s power?

17. Certain critics of nationalist federalism have also reduced the argument to this point. See,
e.g., Richard A. Epstein & Mario Loyola, Saving Federalism, 20 NAT’L AFFAIRS 3, 15 (2014),
available at http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/saving-federalism.
18. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994).
19. Gluck, supra note 12, at 568–74.
20. Id. at 565.
21. Richard T. Ford, Law’s Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REV. 843, 845
(1999); see, e.g., id. at 864 (“[W]e might imagine that the discursive strategy by which a central
government would secure its integrity would be to insist on the synthetic nature of its component
parts . . . . But an equally effective centralization tactic might be to assert the distinctiveness and
uniqueness of its subparts, but only in order to subsume them under a greater whole . . . .”).
22. Id. at 888–89.
23. Id. at 889.
24. But see id. at 890 (noting that the states are sometimes “understood as synthetic
territories”—i.e., non-organic jurisdictions created by another entity to serve its purposes).
25. See Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 12, at 21–33 (arguing that the
study of federalism should include local governments and special purpose institutions).
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If federalism is good for Washington, the answer to the question Gerken
poses near the outset of her lecture is straightforward. “How . . . can a
nationalist believe in giving power to the states?”26 Easy: because giving
power to the states is a means of securing the power of the federal government.
But that’s not the answer the nationalist school of federalism has offered.27
Nor, in my view, is it the answer the nationalist school should offer. While
some acts of devolution increase the power of the federal government, others
decidedly do not. And this is true even when the states are agents, or servants,
of the federal government. When states act uncooperatively, they may
undermine cooperative federalism programs, using the very power conferred
on them by Washington to push back against federal policy choices.28 Even
apparently cooperative forms of state action may pose challenges to federal
authority. When states engage in what David Pozen and I call “uncivil
obedience,” they disrupt federal regimes through literalistic, hyperbolic, or
otherwise unanticipated adherence to federal law or policy.29
One cannot reasonably understand all such state resistance to federal
programs as ultimately serving the federal government. Moreover, doing so
would undermine a key contribution of the nationalist school. The project
Gerken has set out in calling attention to the “power of the servant”30 is to
show how even small spaces of discretion, even power that is not autonomous
but rather conferred and subject to revocation, can yield genuine resistance. To
argue that this form of state dissent necessarily serves the federal government
would suggest there is no real power of the servant after all.
If nationalist federalism does not equate the national with Washington and
cast decentralization as necessarily centralizing, how else might it reconcile
federalism and nationalism? A second possibility is that federalism
domesticates conflict so as to unify a national polity. Call it consensus

26. Gerken, supra note 1, at 999.
27. See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodríguez, Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism: Institutional
and Popular Perspectives, 123 YALE L.J. 2094, 2100 (2014) (arguing that we must “de-center[]
the national from the federal”); Bulman-Pozen, supra note 10, at 1923 (arguing that “the state and
federal governments” are “interdependent sites of national governance”); Gerken, supra note 1, at
1005 (mentioning devolution’s ability to entrench federal power as only one possibility, and also
discussing “national interests writ large”).
28. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 12.
29. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & David E. Pozen, Uncivil Obedience, 115 COLUM. L. REV.
809, 833–36 (2015). For instance, states have challenged federal immigration policy by
incorporating certain federal statutory terms into state law and requiring strict enforcement as a
matter of state law. They have also enacted laws requiring that medication-induced abortions
adhere precisely to a protocol specified by the federal Food and Drug Administration more than a
decade ago and not generally followed by doctors. In both cases, states have taken “a federal
policy that leaves ample space for discretion . . . and challenged that policy by demanding strict
adherence to it a matter of state law.” Id. (manuscript at 26).
30. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1010.
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federalism.31 Here, the “national” would not be Washington, but rather the
American people, and instead of decentralization’s serving the federal
government as such, the argument would be that decentralization engenders
greater public cohesion: an arrangement that licenses dissent so that it is
always already blessed as a structural matter may render disagreements
manageable and underwrite ultimate accord.
This sort of account would lend nationalist federalism some distinguished
traveling companions. We might, for instance, locate a version of the argument
in Sacvan Bercovitch’s study of American ideology. In his sweeping
exploration of American literature, The Rites of Assent, Bercovitch argues that
Americans have always privileged dissent in a manner that places it in the
service of national harmony.32 Various radical reformist movements since the
country’s founding have, in his view, conformed to a “ritual of consensus” that
focuses on the meaning of America and thus “enlist[s] radicalism itself in the
cause of institutional stability.”33 Far from imagining fundamental alternatives,
dissenters have reinforced cultural norms. With a little tweaking, we might
similarly argue that the United States’ federal structure draws out state-based
protest so as to be able to absorb and contain it. Like parents celebrating any
act of rebellion by their child as revealing the independent spirit they have
cultivated, nationalists might reimagine any act of state difference or even
outright dissent as shoring up national consensus.
While the ultimate claim of consensus federalism would differ from
accounts offered by the federalist camp, it might also draw on defenses of state
sovereignty sounding in diversity, experimentation, and contestation.34 State

31. Cf. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION: AND THE MEN
WHO MADE IT, at xxix–xxxii (1948) (arguing that historical research had focused excessively on
conflict in American society and should focus instead on commonalities). Cf. PETER NOVICK,
THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE “OBJECTIVITY QUESTION” AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL
PROFESSION 332–521 (1988) (exploring the debate over consensus history and resulting
historiographical approaches); Justin Driver, The Consensus Constitution, 89 TEX. L. REV. 755
(2011) (critically examining “consensus constitutionalism,” the popular notion that the Supreme
Court generally interprets the Constitution in a way that reflects the consensus beliefs of
Americans).
32. See SACVAN BERCOVITCH, THE RITES OF ASSENT: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE
SYMBOLIC CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA (1993).
33. Id. at 49–50; see also id. at 368 (describing American literature as “the aesthetic
flowering of an ideology adopted from the start precisely for its ability to transmute radicalism of
all kinds, from religious protest to revolutionary war, into varieties of ideological consensus”).
34. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (“This federalist structure of
joint sovereigns preserves to the people numerous advantages. It assures a decentralized
government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it
increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; it allows for more
innovation and experimentation in government; and it makes government more responsive by
putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.”); cf. Ilya Somin, The New Liberal

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1140

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:1133

difference and dissent would not be ends worth preserving in themselves, but
they would nonetheless be valuable insofar as they contributed to a broader
project of national unity. In contrast to the national-as-Washington
perspective’s traditional nationalist bent, the consensus-federalism perspective
might therefore align itself more closely with traditional federalist arguments.
If federalism unifies the nation, it stands to reason that a nationalist
focused on the cohesion of the American polity (rather than the power of the
federal government as such) could believe in giving power to the states.35 As
with the nationalism-as-Washington view, however, consensus federalism also
falls short. There are, to be sure, certain aspects of the argument that resonate
with recent scholarship. Alison LaCroix, for instance, has written about the
Founders’ project of building a “union,” with federalism serving as a tool
rather than an end in itself.36 And Cristina Rodríguez has explored how a
federal structure can, at least sometimes, transform dissent into consensus,
broadly understood.37
But none of the nationalist federalism scholarship argues that federalism
reliably unifies the nation. In the United States, state-centered conflict has
always abounded. Today, even secession- and nullification-talk are having a
renaissance.38 Such conflict is not merely a prelude to consensus, not merely
dissent elicited in order to be defused. While American federalism offers a
framework for accommodating and resolving some disagreements, it tees up
and amplifies others. For the nationalist school of federalism to insist
otherwise would be to refute the possibility of real contestation rather than
embrace it, as it purports to do.39 Just as decentralization does not reliably yield

“Nationalist” Case for Federalism, WASH. POST (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/04/16/the-new-liberal-nationalist-case-for-federalism/
(noting that traditional defenses of federalism also insist “that allowing greater autonomy for state
and local governments often serves important national objectives, such as increasing our ability to
accommodate the needs of a diverse population, and promoting policy experimentation”).
35. See Gerken, supra note 1, at 999 (“How . . . can a nationalist believe in giving power to
the states?”).
36. Alison L. LaCroix, The Shadow Powers of Article I, 123 YALE L.J. 2044, 2089–93
(2014).
37. Cristina M. Rodríguez, Federalism and National Consensus (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author). Importantly, Rodríguez understands “national consensus” to often consist of
contradictions and agreements to disagree. Her consensus is thus quite different from that of
consensus history referenced above. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
38. See Sanford Levinson, The Twenty-First Century Rediscovery of Nullification and
Secession in American Political Rhetoric: Frivolousness Incarnate or Serious Arguments to Be
Wrestled With?, 67 ARK. L. REV. 17 (2014); James H. Read & Neal Allen, Living, Dead, and
Undead: Nullification Past and Present, 1 AM. POL. THOUGHT 263 (2012); see also infra notes
50–53 and accompanying text (discussing recent nullification and secession proposals).
39. See, e.g., supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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centralization, state-located dissent does not reliably enhance nationwide
accord.
II.
If the nationalist school of federalism is not offering an account of how
state power serves the federal government or unifies the American polity, what
account of “the national” does it, or should it, provide? Most basically, I
submit, it defines national in a thin—and therefore capacious—way to include
interests, institutions, and constituencies that cut across state lines.40 Yet while
its understanding of what counts as national is generous, nationalist federalism
calls attention to difference and disagreement within the category of the
national. Nationalist federalism takes from classic accounts of federalism an
insistence on irrepressible diversity and dissent, but instead of mapping
contestation onto state-federal relations as such, it regards diversity and dissent
as national phenomena involving various state and federal actors in shifting
configurations.
There are, it follows, two principal ways nationalist federalism complicates
our understanding of nationalism (and not only of federalism). First, it breaks
open the category of the national, destabilizing traditional views of unitary
federal power and singular national interests.41 Even as the two accounts
sketched above—taking national to refer to the federal government or to a
unified American community—depart from common assumptions about the
relationship between federalism and nationalism, they presuppose that there is
something, one thing, that can confidently be identified as the national.
Nationalist federalism challenges this supposition. It casts national institutions,
interests, and constituencies as necessarily multifarious.
The federal government, for instance, must be broken into its component
parts. Reckoning with this requires more than just the usual caveat footnote
stating and then brushing past the idea that the federal government, or any
particular branch, is a “they, not an it.”42 When discussing federal law or
policy, we must attend to how Congress and the executive may advance
separate, even conflicting, agendas. We must consider how different actors
within these branches may seek different ends. While we can properly
40. E.g., Rodríguez, supra note 27, at 2100 (defining “national” issues as “those whose
salience cuts across state lines and constituencies”).
41. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 10, at 1934–35; see also Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National]
Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996, 1999 (2014) (arguing that national federalism “is a nationalism
that often lacks nationalism’s defining theoretical feature—uniformity”).
42. For excavations of certain institutions’ plural characters and the consequences for theory,
see, for example, Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as
Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992); Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They,
Not an It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549
(2005).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1142

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:1133

understand these many actors as national actors advancing national interests,
we also need to recognize the multiplicity of the national. There are always a
variety of national actors, advancing different, and perhaps contradictory,
national interests.
If an argument that federalism serves nationalism-as-Washington falls
short in part because not all exercises of state authority serve the federal
government,43 then, it also falls short because it conceptualizes the federal
government as unitary. While certain state actions augment or challenge the
power of the federal government conceived as a single entity, many state
actions have a more ambivalent relationship to the federal government. Some
state acts enhance congressional power at the expense of executive power.
When a federal law confers implementation authority on both the states and the
federal executive branch, for instance, this partial devolution to the states will
tend to shore up congressional authority but to constrain federal executive
discretion.44 Other state acts empower the executive branch over Congress or
empower one part of the bureaucracy over another.45 To fully appreciate the
relationship between states and the federal government, we therefore need to
disaggregate the latter and not only the former. A nationalist perspective on
federalism calls for a richer integration of federalism doctrine and theory with
the doctrine and theory of separation of powers and administrative law.46
That states affect the distribution of power within the federal government
leads to a second observation about how nationalist federalism reorients our
understanding of nationalism. Rather than take “the national” to be something
that exists separate and apart from the states, nationalist federalism understands
the ineluctable diversity of national interests, institutions, and constituencies to
itself be generated and instantiated in part by the states. The thoroughgoing
integration of state and federal governance has implications for nationalism as
well as federalism. States continue to be relevant actors without a robust
separate sphere of action precisely because they help define national interests
and act on behalf of national constituencies.
One upshot of this integration is that it is not partisans of states versus the
federal government as such who are waging the battles that matter. It is,
instead, partisans of various interests who wage their national battles through

43. See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text.
44. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 459 (2012).
45. See Rodríguez, supra note 27, at 2110 (noting disagreements about immigration policy
and drug policy within the executive branch that may be exacerbated by state actions).
46. For work integrating federalism with the separation of powers and administrative law
from a more traditional federalism perspective, see, for example, Bradford R. Clark, Separation
of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1325 (2001); Gillian E. Metzger,
Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023 (2008); and Miriam Seifter,
States as Interest Groups in the Administrative Process, 100 VA. L. REV. 953 (2014).
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state and federal sites. Perhaps most important are partisans in the colloquial
sense: the United States’ federal structure furnishes the terrain on which the
Democratic and Republican parties fight.47 Although the text of these fights
often reads as federalism—the states challenging Washington’s overreach in
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, for example, or the states
challenging Washington’s inaction with respect to greenhouse gas emissions—
the not-so-subtle subtext is partisan politics.48 States controlled by Republicans
challenge a Democratic federal administration; then states controlled by
Democrats challenge a Republican federal administration. And these state
actors are supported, not opposed, by federal politicians who share their party
affiliation.49 There is still conflict aplenty, but it is best understood as national
versus national, with the states helping to formulate and concretize a variety of
national interests.
Even the most extreme state-centric tools of federalism, secession and
nullification, have been repurposed as tools of national partisan struggle in
recent years. Cries for states to secede from the union or to nullify federal law
do not reflect the separation of state and national, but rather their deep
integration. When residents of Texas, Tennessee, and other states petitioned
the White House to withdraw from the United States in 2012,50 for example,

47. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077 (2014).
48. See, e.g., Robert N. Weiner, Much Ado: The Potential Impact of the Supreme Court
Decision Upholding the Affordable Care Act, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME
COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 69, 69–72 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2013)
(describing how Republican officials representing twenty-seven states argued that the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act violated state sovereignty, while Democratic officials
representing thirteen states defended the exercise of federal power); JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33812, CLIMATE CHANGE: ACTION BY STATES TO ADDRESS
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS (2008) (describing how Democratic legislators in California,
Hawaii, and New Jersey passed laws to reduce greenhouse gas emissions when the George W.
Bush administration took no action on climate change).
49. Sometimes these state actors are even prodded to resist federal law by federal politicians
in the first instance. Witness, for instance, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell’s attempt to
undermine federal Environmental Protection Agency regulations about coal-fired power plant
emissions by asking the states not to comply with the regulations. Senator Mitch McConnell,
Letter to the Nation’s Governors (Mar. 19, 2015), available at http://www.mcconnell.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm?p=newsletters&ContentRecord_id=d57eba06-0718-4a22-8f59-1e610793a2a3&
ContentType_id=9b9b3f28-5479-468a-a86b-10c747f4ead7&Group_id=2085dee5-c311-48128bea-2dad42782cd4; see also Coral Davenport, McConnell Urges States to Help Thwart
Obama’s ‘War on Coal,’ N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/20/
us/politics/mitch-mcconnell-urges-states-to-help-thwart-obamas-war-on-coal.html (“Since
Mr.
McConnell is limited in how he can use his role in the Senate to block regulations, he has taken
the unusual step of reaching out to governors with a legal blueprint for them to follow to stop the
rules in their states.”).
50. E.g., Peacefully Grant the State of Texas to Withdraw from the United States of
America and Create Its Own NEW Government, WE THE PEOPLE (Nov. 9, 2012),
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they were participating in, not forsaking, national political struggle. Secession
talk wasn’t about vindicating distinctive state cultures. It was about the
alienation of Republicans upon the reelection of a Democratic president.51 So
too, the recent embrace of nullification by some state legislatures can best be
understood in terms of national partisan contest, not state exceptionalism.
Focused largely on healthcare and gun control,52 state nullification legislation
reflects and advances a national Republican position about a Democratic
federal administration’s policies. That’s why we find federal politicians
supporting, even goading, state efforts to nullify federal law.53
This is not, then, a sanguine story of consensus federalism. The ways in
which states articulate and amplify national conflict are front and center. But
precisely insofar as states articulate and amplify national conflict, this account
understands federalism to exert centripetal force.54 States don’t function as
enclaves, facilitating Americans’ ability to opt out of national ideological
struggles. Instead, they provide many points of entry into fractious national
debates.
*

*

*

The nationalist school of federalism has responded to federalist concerns
about waning state power by describing how states continue to exercise

https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition/peacefully-grant-state-texas-withdraw-united-states-a
merica-and-create-its-own-new-government/BmdWCP8B.
51. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 47, at 1114–15; see also Jim Gaines, One in Four
Americans Want Their State to Secede from the U.S., but Why?, REUTERS (Sept. 19, 2014),
http://blogs.reuters.com/jamesrgaines/2014/09/19/one-in-four-americans-want-their-state-to-se
cede-from-the-u-s-but-why/ (“Secession got more support from Republicans than Democrats,
more from right- than left-leaning independents . . . . And of the people who said they identified
with the Tea Party, supporters of secession were actually in the majority, with 53 percent.”); Eric
Kleefeld, Poll: Texas Republicans Approve of Rick Perry’s Secession Remarks, TALKING POINTS
MEMO (Apr. 23, 2009, 6:54 PM), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/poll-texas-republicansapprove-of-rick-perry-s-secession-remarks (finding that 48% of Republican survey participants
thought Texas would be better off as an independent nation, and that 51% of Republican survey
participants approved of Governor Rick Perry’s suggestion that Texas might need to leave the
United States).
52. See Read & Allen, supra note 38, at 263–67 (cataloging examples).
53. See, e.g., Igor Bobic, Joni Ernst Has a History of Advocating Nullification of Federal
Laws, HUFFINGTON POST (July 29, 2014, 4:16 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/29/
joni-ernst-nullification_n_5631097.html (discussing then-Senate candidate Joni Ernst’s support
for nullification); James Hohmann, Touting Ken Cuccinelli, Ron Paul Urges ‘Nullification,’
POLITICO (Nov. 4, 2013, 11:27 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/11/ken-cuccinelli-ronaul-urges-nullification-virginia-governor-2013-election-99358.html (describing a speech in which
Ron Paul argued for the nullification of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act).
54. See Gerken, supra note 14, at 1897 (arguing that nationalists “have long worried that
decentralization exercises a centrifugal force on the polity,” but that it can have an integrative
force).
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meaningful authority without separate, sovereign spheres of action. A set of
normative questions has, as Gerken argues, been met in part with empirical
answers.55 But understandings of nationalism do not emerge from this study
unscathed. If state power today inheres in its integration with federal power, so
too federal power today inheres in its integration with state power. State and
federal actors alike use both state and federal governments to advance national
agendas. They work together to articulate and further particular national
interests, and, in so doing, oppose other combinations of state and federal
actors who are championing distinct national interests. Nationalism is not
something that exists apart from, let alone in distinction to, federalism. Instead,
states play a constitutive role in our national rites of dissent.

55. See Gerken, supra note 1, at 1008 (“[F]ederalism has always been a field . . . in which
you can answer a normative question with an empirical answer.”).
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